



A Call To Action—

The Truth About Big Tobacco's Counteradvertising Campaign



Smart Children **DON'T SMOKE!**

They do as they're told.



Warning—Just because an advertising campaign is anti-tobacco doesn't mean it won't inspire the opposite reaction. How would most teens respond to this fictional ad?

A Call to Action—

The Truth About Big Tobacco's Counteradvertising Campaign

Despite recent court settlements in favor of anti-tobacco interests, children in America remain pawns in the war between the tobacco industry and its opponents. Specifically at stake is youths' attentiveness to and antismoking messages via television and sales-site media. States such as Florida, California, and Massachusetts have developed hard-hitting, edgy advertisements openly critical of the tobacco industry, which the tobacco industry has opposed and criticized. At the same time, the tobacco industry seeks to be participating in the antitobacco campaign by developing a series of antitobacco efforts themselves.

Is This for Real?

Tobacco company advertisements used to imply, "It's cool to smoke." Community partnerships tried to counter this message by saying, "Smoking kills." However, that didn't work with a youth/teenage market, so they involved youth in the solution and countered with, "Pay attention to the real message: Tobacco companies are using you." Bingo!

According to Bauer (1999), "from 1998 to 1999, the prevalence of current cigarette use among middle school students declined from 18.5% to 15.0% ($p < 0.01$); among high school students, use declined from 27.4% to 25.2% ($p = 0.02$)." Now tobacco companies have begun saying, "We don't want you (youth) to smoke." Experts find that these industry-sponsored messages fail to discourage teens from smoking and are motivated by a desire to salvage the tobacco industry's tarnished image. Once again, it's up to community partnerships to find the "Bingo!"—this time, to counteract the counteradvertising campaign.

Questions:

1. Should antismoking interests (and children) believe tobacco companies are sincere in these "youth don't smoke" messages?
2. What are children hearing in this tobacco-interest-sponsored campaign?
3. Regardless of the answers to questions 1 and 2, how should community partnerships respond to this counteradvertising campaign?

A History of Marketing to Teens

Understanding the tobacco industry's history of marketing to teens can help community partnerships better deal with the counteradvertising campaign. Confidential papers and internal documents obtained by Congressman Henry Waxman reveal that the tobacco industry has long pursued a strategy of tempting adolescents to smoke.

In 1975, RJ Reynolds (RJR) attempted to capture the youth market as revealed in an internal memorandum. It stated, "To ensure increased and longer term growth for Camel Filter, the brand must increase its share penetration among the 14–24 age market, which have a new set of more liberal values and which represent tomorrow's cigarette business" (Josefson, 1998).

A comic-book-advertising approach featuring a "cool" character named Joe Camel was suggested by RJR internal memos from 1973. Another document, dated 1974, referred to a direct advertising appeal aimed at younger smokers. As recently as 1988,



Past ad campaigns for tobacco have included cartoons. Did you know this practice was outlawed in the '98 Multistate Master Settlement Agreement? Big Tobacco might have lost some big hooks, but their objective remains the same.

documents showed a systematic, planned marketing attempt aimed at teenagers through rock concerts and advertisements in youth magazines and in places where young people gather. Documents further show that RJR commissioned studies examining the market preferences for youth as young as 14 (Josefson, 1998).

In the case of *Patricia Henley v. Philip Morris*, the jury found that Philip Morris had committed nine violations including "fraud by intentional misrepresentation." In his decision, Judge John E. Munter noted that the evidence revealed it had been important for "Philip Morris to secure teenagers as customers," and that "Philip Morris

has willfully and consciously marketed its cigarettes to teenagers. In fact, such efforts are important, if not necessary, to commercial success in this business." The trial evidence included internal memos that revealed "that Philip Morris hired an outside organization to gather information on smokers, including teenage smokers" who were 12–17 years of age (Stockholder Proposals, 1999, Philip Morris).

Tobacco companies also have conducted marketing campaigns that, by stimulating desire for their promotional items, may serve to move young teenagers from nonsmoking status toward regular use of tobacco. Feighery, Borzekowski, Schooler, and Flora (1998) studied 571 seventh graders, examining the relationship between their receptivity to these marketing campaigns and their susceptibility to start smoking. Youth who were more receptive were more susceptible to start smoking; approximately 70% of the participants indicated at least moderate receptivity to tobacco marketing materials. These study results demonstrate a clear association between this kind of tobacco marketing practice and youths' susceptibility to smoke.

However, Florida's "truth" campaign, created to change youth attitudes about tobacco, turned the tables on this type of marketing. "The marketing team designed "truth"-branded T-shirts, baseball caps, and lanyards for distribution throughout the state via the "truth" truck, a van that traveled to teen events statewide providing feedback about the campaign" (Zucker, Hopkins, Sly, Ulrich, Kershaw & Solari, 2000, p. 2)

What they *CAN'T* do

The Multistate Master Settlement Agreement reached in November 1998:

- **Bans** the use of cartoons in the advertising, promotion, packaging, or labeling of tobacco products
- **Prohibits** targeting youth in promotions, advertising, or marketing
- **Bans** all outdoor advertising, including billboards


- **Bans** the distribution and sale of apparel and merchandise with brand-name logos (caps, T-shirts, backpacks, etc.)
- **Bans** payments to promote tobacco products in movies, television shows, and other media
- **Prohibits** brand-name sponsorship of events with a significant youth audience
- **Bans** gifts of tobacco without proof of age



Sincerity or Just Good PR?

Some industry-sponsored programs that purport to decrease smoking among teens may be ineffective in doing so and may, in fact, enhance the tarnished image of the tobacco industry. Recently, for example, tobacco companies have sponsored voluntary retailer compliance programs. Even though it has been illegal to sell tobacco to children for some time, the industry has chosen only recently to link its advertising with supporting the law.

In an evaluation of "It's the Law," the retailer compliance program sponsored by the tobacco industry, the researchers found the program was not associated with a significant reduction in illegal sales. DiFranza and Brown (1992) surveyed tobacco retailers to evaluate the program's efficacy, the stated goal of which is the elimination of the illegal sale of tobacco to youth. Of the retailers surveyed, only 4.5% were participating in the program and 86% of those involved still were willing to sell cigarettes to children.



This illegal sales prevention strategy sponsored by the industry appears to be "safe" for them and more designed to enhance their public image than to effect a change in youth tobacco use. A similar evaluation conducted by the Council for a Tobacco Free Manitoba found that a campaign called "Tobacco and Youth: No Sale" resulted in only minimal and short-lived change. Referring to a


recent industry-sponsored educational campaign aimed at retailers, Jo-Anne Douglas of the Manitoba Lung Association stated, "[The campaign] is nothing more than a smokescreen for a discredited industry trying to cast themselves in a favorable light. It would be incredibly naive to believe that tobacco companies want to prevent youth from taking up smoking" (Douglas, 1999).

Recently, Philip Morris USA has invested more than \$100 million in a national campaign that it says is part of a multipronged effort to reduce teenage smoking. Critics contend that these commercials, which run on every major television network, actually provide subtle advantages to the tobacco product manufacturer because they provide Philip Morris with a "legitimate" advertising spot in prime time. In addition, through the focus groups designed to assist in the development of this campaign, Philip Morris has gained access to the attitudes and values emerging of American youth (Torry, 1999). This access helps the industry better design their product advertising to counteract anti-tobacco group campaigns and continue to enlist new teen smokers.

Further, Philip Morris has sought to link itself to the wholesome image of 4-H clubs. The National 4-H Council, consisting of more than six million young people, has accepted a \$4.3 million grant from the Philip Morris Company to develop a community-based antismoking program. In a similar attempt, Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation recently contributed a \$230,000 grant to the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) to develop a youth program (Torry, 1999).

Some critics believe these activities are a recognition by the industry of the potentially negative economic impact that more restrictive laws and regulations might bring. As a consequence, the industry is attempting to create good will and to implement alternative strategies to mitigate the mandated requirements that state and national regulation impose.

The same technology used to sell cigarettes is being used to create counterads that purposely fail. The industry purports to denigrate teen use of tobacco products but employs the information it has gathered for this campaign to better capture the very market it has been denied.





**When you
grow up,
you will be
allowed to
smoke.**

**Until then,
leave smoking
to the adults.**

Warning—This fictional ad technically condemns youth smoking, but in doing so, may actually promote it. So-called “youth antismoking” ads, commonly used in Big Tobacco’s media campaign, actually glamorize a smoker’s lifestyle by making tobacco use appear “adult.” Some studies suggest these ads effectively encourage teens to smoke.

A 1995 internal Philip Morris document quoted Ellen Merlo, Philip Morris's senior vice president of corporate affairs, "If we don't do something fast to project the sense of industry responsibility regarding the youth access issue, we are going to be looking at severe marketing restrictions in a very short time. Those restrictions will pave the way for equally severe legislation or regulation on where adults are allowed to smoke" (Josefson, 1998).

What Do They Really Want?

In a commentary written for *Business Week*, David Greising (1998), a news writer who covers the tobacco industry, stated that the industry realizes that massive advertising designed to scare future smokers (young people) is likely to fail. He further stated that lawsuit settlements that have limited the antitobacco programs to underage smoking in the long term will not be effective. As Stanton Glantz, an antismoking activist said, "The tobacco industry has done a great job of snookering everyone into saying, 'Just let's stop youth from smoking.' To the extent any program is limited to youth, it will fail" (Greising, 1998).

In fact, antismoking ads produced by tobacco companies may actually be a means of recruiting new customers. Dr. Michael Siegel, testifying in the recent Florida "sick smokers" trial, stated that the tobacco industry's "Think, Don't Smoke" slogan conveys the opposite of its stated message. Dr. Siegel said the campaign seems to tell youth, "If you want to be thought of as a nerd like I was, then go ahead and don't smoke. But if you want to avoid that kind of ridicule, man, take up a cigarette and be cool" (Associated Press, May 31, 2000).

The sincerity of the industry's antismoking campaign is dubious. For an industry that spends \$16 million/day recruiting new customers using the best available advertising techniques, its antismoking ads stand out as lessons in how *not* to get a message across. *USA Today* advertising columnist Bruce Horowitz placed Philip Morris' new campaign on his "Worst Ads of 1998" list. He wrote: "This is Philip Morris' jaded attempt at PR. Three spots with kids who say smoking isn't cool. . . . Philip Morris says it wants kids to stop smoking. Right. Just like Bill Gates wants kids to stop staring at computer screens" (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 1999).


Think the tobacco industry is playing fair? In 1999, tobacco company advertising in magazines with 15% youth readership or higher increased by almost \$30 million in the first nine months—33% higher than the same period in 1998 (that is, after the settlement). Eight of the top 10 cigarette brands reached at least 70% of 12- to 17-year-olds with five or more magazine ads in 1999. This is not meeting the letter of the law. This is flaunting it.

American Heart Association, news release, May 17, 2000

Does It Work?

The tobacco industry claims to have developed advertising messages consistent with antismoking themes, such as the "Think, Don't Smoke" campaign sponsored by Philip Morris (Novelli, 1999). Philip Morris specifically states that built-in "fire walls" separate the youth anti-smoking program from the company. When Peter Zollo of Teenage Research Unlimited used focus groups of 12–16 year olds to test advertisements developed by Philip Morris against those developed by Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and Florida, the tobacco industry advertisements were consistently weaker. The Florida Tobacco Pilot Program's (FTPP) "truth" campaign relied on youth at every phase of development. The campaign tapped into teens' need to rebel and depicted "tobacco use as an addictive habit marketed by an adult establishment. Using the same production values and edgy humor that commercial marketers use to reach young people,


Percentage Decrease in Youth Smoking* Since the Beginning of the FTTP



* smoked cigarettes on one or more of the past 30 days
Source: Florida Youth Tobacco Survey, 2000.

the "truth" spots are shot in a range of styles to ensure that teens are surprised by, and become engaged in, the ads' message" (Zucker, et al., 2000, p. 2). The most effective advertisements were those that portrayed the effects of smoking graphically and dramatically (Fairclough, 1999). For example, the state of Massachusetts produced an advertisement in which a woman smokes through a hole in her throat. It consistently had the greatest impact on the youth. Zollo said, "Some youth told us . . . that the (industry ad) message is: It is up to them [the youth] whether they do or don't smoke" (Torry, 1999). Several of the youth in the focus groups reported that the Philip Morris ads sounded like parents giving a lecture. Critics fear that teens may, indeed, rebel against such a message and start smoking (Fairclough, 1999).

Kathryn Kahler Vose of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Youth stated, "This is really more of an image campaign for Philip Morris. This is not Philip Morris suddenly deciding that it doesn't want youth to smoke. Philip Morris knows that if youth don't smoke, their new customers dwindle. They need to attract youth. Generally,



The tobacco plant is a lovely plant— a hearty, wholesome, robust crop.

**But if you're underage,
just forget we told you.**

when you say, 'Hey, you shouldn't smoke,' youth will do just the opposite. So I question the validity of this approach. Telling youth not to smoke, I suspect, will probably encourage some youth to smoke" (Elliott, December 8, 1998).

Advertising executive Jeff Hicks points out, "The biggest mistakes you can make is to tell kids not to smoke, tell kids it's bad for them, tell them it's an adult decision, tell them 'smoking's not cool,' and then the other worst, worst thing[,] which a lot of people do, is take 'adult' messages and put it in the mouths of children . . . Like Philip Morris ads are doing right now: 'Hey, I don't need to smoke to be cool.' And kids are, like, 'Yeah, right!' You know, they see through that so fast" (Holtz, 1999).

At the 1999 Stockholders Meeting of the Philip Morris Company, Anne Morrow Donley, on behalf of the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word Health Care System, submitted a proposal to the board requesting that they submit tobacco ad campaigns, current and future, to independent and certifiable testing, to be certain they do not attract teens under 18. Ms. Donley proposed that this independent testing should apply to all the tobacco ads, including the current \$100 million ad campaign, which the company calls a "youth smoking prevention effort" (Stockholder Proposals, 1999, Philip Morris). This proposal and three others related to significantly enhancing a legitimate antitobacco campaign from Philip Morris were defeated. (See www.gasp.org/pm.html for the other proposals. Source: FTCC.)

The tobacco industry continues to engage in a wide array of deceptive techniques to reach youth. Recently, Brown and Williamson, in an effort to deflect negative public attention through humor, put the following jingle on its company answering machine:

Oooh, the tobacco plant is a lovely plant, its leaves so broad and green. But you shouldn't think about the tobacco plant if you're still a teen. 'Cause tobacco is a big person's plant and that's the way it should be. So, if you're under 21 go and climb a tree. Oh, the tobacco plant is a lovely plant. And that my friends is no yarn! We let it ripen in the field, then hang it in a barn.

Warning—This fictional ad, based on a Brown and Williamson jingle, demonstrates how ineffective a counteradvertising message can be when casually injected into a pro-tobacco ad.

Those involved in the antitobacco effort did not find the jingle humorous. "The so-called 'humorous jingle' is part of a campaign that Brown and Williamson has been engaged in for the last year," said Matthew L. Myers, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Youth president. "By an attempt at humor, Brown and Williamson appears to be trying to do two things: make light of the gravity of the whole tobacco situation and make light of serious allegations of wrongdoing . . . that devastated their reputation. It's an extraordinarily clever way to seek to undermine the gravity of the health concerns of tobacco and the public's low respect for them as a company" (Pollak, 2000).

Additionally, tobacco companies may be increasing their focus on the "legal" market of 18–25 year olds. Companies have been hosting Kool Nites, Camel Club events, and

"When 14-year olds see Leonardo DiCaprio lighting up on screen, millions spent on antismoking messages go up in smoke."

—David Greising of Business Week

Marlboro Party Nights in bars throughout the nation and featuring advertisements in magazines such as *Rolling Stone* that portray the image of cigarettes as essential to nightlife. Unfortunately, these attempts may have great appeal to youth younger than the "legal" age. Gregory Connolly of the Massachusetts tobacco control program said, "The advertising that works best for the 15-year old is targeting a 25-year old. Referring to the tobacco industry's supposed distancing from

the youth market, Myers said, "The only thing that's changed is the rhetoric. The tobacco companies haven't changed their marketing behavior at all" (Lavelle, 2000).

According to Frank Penela, Communications Director for the Florida Department of Health, "The tobacco industry claims that it is not marketing to young people. If that's so, why are tobacco companies bringing out vanilla- and spice-flavored cigarettes? Tobacco companies are just as focused on the youth market as ever" (Interview, December 21, 2000).

Another tactic that has since been banned was the offer of free promotional materials, which may have had an impact on teen smoking. Lois Biener of the University of Massachusetts-Boston studied youth who owned a piece of merchandise with a brand logo (i.e., T-shirt, hat) or teens who could name a brand of cigarette and found that these teens were more than twice as likely to





Smoking Is WRONG!

And you were told the same about rap, techno, video games, the Internet, and skateboarding.

Remember, teens are often told a lot of what they enjoy is bad for them. They're becoming adults and making their own choices. Youth-led programs like Students Working Against Tobacco (SWAT) empower youth to develop their own strategies for waging the battle against Big Tobacco.

become smokers. According to Biener, "Those youth who get items that sort of display those logos that stand for those images and those identities seem to use that as an opportunity to try on the identity of the smoker." That is, promotional marketing created an image for teens to copy (Elliott, March 1, 2000).

According to Penela, Florida spent "\$15 million on marketing and media last year and will spend \$15 million on marketing and media this year" (Interview, December 21, 2000).

The tobacco industry is willing and able to spend large sums of money to market their products in this way, outlaying much more than the states can. For example, Connolly reports that the state of Massachusetts spends \$10 million annually to counter the \$5 billion that the tobacco industry spends to market its products (Elliott, March 1, 2000).

The influence on youth of tobacco use in films and movies cannot be overlooked. David Greising (1998) of *Business Week* describes it this way: "When 14-year olds see Leonardo DiCaprio lighting up on screen, millions spent on antismoking messages go up in smoke." Indeed, Distefan, Gilpin, Sargent, and Pierce (1999) in a study of over 6000 adolescents found nonsmoker teens who preferred a favorite movie star who smoked were significantly more likely to be susceptible to smoking. This is particularly disturbing in light of recent studies indicating that nearly 90% of movies and 30% of all movie scenes contain at least one instance of cigarette smoking. For example, Goldstein, Sobel, and Newman (1999) surveyed 50 G-rated animated children's films and found that 56% contained one or more instances of tobacco use without clear verbal messages of any negative long-term health effects. And good characters were just as likely to use tobacco as bad characters.

Designing Effective Counteradvertising Efforts

The American Legacy Foundation, created by the November 1998 Multistate Master Settlement Agreement between the tobacco industry and the states' attorneys general, recently withdrew several hard-hitting advertisements amid criticism by the tobacco industry. The industry said that the advertisements violated the agreement, which prohibits the foundation from producing advertisements that vilify the tobacco companies. One of the advertisements, for example, featured teens unloading body

bags in front of the Philip Morris headquarters building in New York. The foundation has \$185 million in its advertising budget this year and plans to create a youth-driven antitobacco movement similar to the “truth” campaign waged in Florida (Elliott, February 16, 2000).

Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, sponsored a similar advertising campaign in that state and said, “There’s no question that the kind of advertising you need to do is the kind of advertisement you’d see on MTV or one of those programs. It’s got to be over the top. I mean, it’s got to be something that cuts through and breaks through everything else that’s on the TV set. Otherwise, youth won’t pay attention to it at all” (Elliott, February 16, 2000).

An early example of effective counteradvertising for tobacco prevention was developed by Bonnie Vierthaler of The BADvertising Institute. Since 1986, Vierthaler has presented counteradvertising messages for tobacco prevention using exhibits, posters and billboards, slides presentations, hands-on materials, and an award-winning Web site. Her approach also seeks to protect youth from being manipulated by the tobacco industry by helping them understand cause and effect. To do this, BADvertising changes misleading ads sponsored by the tobacco industry to create a more accurate representation of the truth by superimposing another image over a tobacco ad.

Some state groups, such as those in Florida and Massachusetts, have opted to run “in-your-face” type advertisements that feature dying smokers or that villainize the tobacco companies in an effort to counter the “soft touch” advertisements sponsored by the tobacco companies. Florida’s “truth” campaign television ads featured teens confronting executives of tobacco companies about the virulent effects of tobacco. According to Zucker, et al. (2000), they expose “the lies and misinformation perpetuated by tobacco industry marketing.” These commercials range from what “looks like the movie trailer for a thriller whose villain is the tobacco industry, to what seems to be a home video of teens calling tobacco industry executives on the phone” (p. 2). According to the *Florida Anti-Tobacco Media Evaluation: Eighteen Month Assessment*, data collected show that the advertising campaign was the “truth” campaign’s most effective component and that the television advertising campaign was “the most effective in terms of reaching the largest number of target youth and effectively delivering the campaign’s industry manipulation message” (Sly & Heald, 1999).

The “truth” Attitude

“The ‘truth’ campaign was created to change youth attitudes about tobacco and to reduce teen tobacco use throughout Florida by using youth-driven advertising, public relations, and advocacy. Results of the campaign include

- **a 92 percent brand awareness rate among teens,**
- **a 15 percent rise in teens who agree with a key attitudinal statements about smoking,**
- **a 19.4 percent decline in smoking among middle school students, and**
- **a 8.0 percent decline among high school students.**

States committed to results-oriented youth anti-tobacco campaigns should look to Florida’s ‘truth’ campaign as a model that effectively places youth at the helm of anti-tobacco efforts.”

—Zucker, et al., p. 1



Connolly, director of the Massachusetts tobacco control program, said, "Philip Morris can't do the kind of [antitobacco] advertisements that work best. It's impossible for them to put a dying Marlboro Man on TV like we did" (Fairclough, 1999).

Public health campaigns that clearly communicate the risk and dangers of smoking may also be effective in changing beliefs about smoking. The tobacco industry markets "light" cigarettes in such a way that they will be perceived as less of a health risk than regular cigarettes. To demonstrate this point, a media-based advertising campaign designed to communicate the dangers of light and ultra-light cigarettes was delivered to targeted audiences in Massachusetts. Preliminary analyses of a survey of 500 smokers and ex-smokers in Massachusetts compared with similar populations from other states found that smokers who had not seen the ads were more likely to believe that light cigarettes reduced health risks (Kozlowski, 2000).

Greising (1998) has stated that only messages with specific themes will work with teens. The tobacco industry fails to use these types of ads. Teens inclined to suspect authority attend to advertisements that portray the tobacco industry as manipulative or deceitful. Similarly, advertisements that reveal the dangers of secondhand smoke speak to a sense of injustice felt by some teens.

Andrew Holtz, with the Kaiser Family Foundation, found that anti-industry advertisements are the most effective. These advertisements turn

The first rule of any counter-marketing effort is to know what your competition is doing in the marketplace.

**—American Legacy Foundation,
May 16, 2000**

the rebelliousness of teens against the industry. He said, "Instead of saying, 'Don't smoke,' say, 'Don't be manipulated by these profit-making corporations who want to hook you on an addictive substance in order to take money away from you, and they don't care if you die in the process.' . . . Look youth, look teens, don't be dupes of the tobacco industry. Stand up and rebel against the establishment" (Young People, Education and Smoking, 1999).

McKenna, Gutierrez, and McCall (2000) state, "Intensive and sustained efforts to 'counter-market' tobacco among teenagers are necessary to negate the 'friendly familiarity' created by tobacco advertising and to communicate the true health and social costs of tobacco use." They recommend that counter-marketing campaigns depict a tobacco-free lifestyle as the preferred way of life for diverse and interesting individuals; explain the dangers of tobacco in a personal, emotional way; offer youth empowerment and control; use multiple voices, strategies, and executions; offer constructive alternatives to tobacco use; and portray smoking as unacceptable and undesirable for everyone.

Effective counteradvertising efforts are not simple to design. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Office on Smoking and Health conducted focus group research on a counteradvertising strategy aimed at exposing the predatory marketing techniques of the tobacco industry. The office developed draft print advertisements and a TV commercial featuring theme lines such as, "You get an image. They get an addict." When the campaign materials were tested, results indicated that they did not communicate the concept of manipulation by the industry clearly and effectively to young teens. In fact, 38 percent of the teens that viewed the TV spot believed that they promoted smoking. These findings underscore the need for ongoing evaluation throughout the creative process to ensure counteradvertisements communicate the desired messages to the audience (McKenna & Williams, 1993).

Goldman and Glantz (1998) reviewed ads that had been aired and concept advertisements that were not produced, identifying eight typical counteradvertising strategies: industry manipulation, secondhand smoke, addiction, cessation, youth access, short-term effects, long-term health effects, and romantic rejection. In a study conducted by professional advertising agencies, over 1500 children and adults dealing with 118 advertisements in 186 focus groups identified strategies as effective or ineffective. According to focus group participants, industry manipulation and secondhand smoke are the two most effective strategies for denormalizing

smoking and reducing cigarette consumption. Addiction and cessation, when used in conjunction with the industry manipulation and secondhand smoke strategies, also can be effective. Youth access, short-term effects, long-term health effects, and romantic rejection were identified as ineffective strategies. Advertising strategies labeled as aggressive were more effective at reducing tobacco consumption than "soft touch" approaches.


Industry manipulation has been suggested by these focus groups as a particularly effective message to prevent smoking uptake and encourage cessation. This approach involves portraying the tobacco industry as dishonest and predatory. While the tobacco industry glamorizes smoking and portrays smokers as popular, sexy, and appealing, the industry manipulation approach portrays tobacco industry executives as manipulators and liars who would do anything to addict young people with their products. This strategy could be an effective element to long-term prevention (Sly, et al., 2000).

Surveys conducted of Florida middle and high school youth over an 18-month period showed a decline in receptivity to the ads. "Given the value that young people place on seeing and hearing 'new' things in the media, it is not surprising that the largest decline occurred for the item asking if advertisements were liked. However, the fact that 78 percent of respondents still reported liking the "truth" advertisements suggest that their appeal is more lasting than that of many other advertisements" (Sly & Heald, 1999).



SWAT members spread the message of manipulation to parade watchers.

Percent of 1998 and 1999 Florida Respondents of All Ages Confirming Awareness of Combined TV Ads and Three Measures of Receptivity



Source: Sly and Heald, 1999.

What can local partnerships do?

Although the fight against tobacco is a difficult war to win, there are several ways that local partnerships can help assure victory:

Support the efforts of state and national counteradvertising campaigns. Where possible, local programs should be linked to broader state and national programs. Local coalitions can link their efforts and programs to broad-based efforts such as the "truth" campaign. Efforts that are part of a larger campaign will be much more effective than isolated attempts to reach youth. Local activities should support and endorse the messages from the state and national campaign and share their own especially successful efforts with other local coalitions.

Empower youth to become involved and active in the campaign. Getting youth involved in developing and delivering counteradvertising efforts is key to successful efforts. Youth must see and believe that the campaign originates with them, rather than "the establishment." Be creative at finding ways to allow youth to express their outrage and disgust with the tobacco industry's manipulative efforts to get them to smoke.

Reveal the deceptive tactics of the tobacco industry to dupe teens.

Counteradvertising that exposes the deceptive tactics of the tobacco industry are more effective than attempts that simply tell youth not to smoke. Reveal the subtle advertising ploys of the tobacco industry and help youth become media literate regarding tobacco use promotion. Use available media message analytical tools such as MediaSharp to ask critical questions about counteradvertising, such as:

- Who is communicating and why?
- Who owns, profits from, and pays for the message?
- How is the message communicated (ex: Philip Morris black-and-white TV ad)?
- Who receives the message? What do they think they mean?
- What is the intended purpose of the message? Whose point of view is behind the message?
- What is NOT being said and why?
- Is the message consistent within itself? Is it part of a coherent message strategy or does it stand out in some way?

Teachers may apply for a grant from “The Artful Truth,” a program that funds antitobacco projects developed in the classroom.

Do not yield to the “vanilla” campaign offered by the tobacco industry, which may actually drive youth toward smoking. It is clear that the antismoking messages designed by the tobacco industry, in general, are not effective with youth



If you smoke, quit. People around you will notice the difference, and the fewer “evangelists” Big Tobacco has, the stronger our partnership will be. Think about it—smoking is publicity for Big Tobacco, as if there aren’t enough reasons to kick the habit.

and may, in fact, attract teens to smoke. Local partnerships should distance themselves from these ineffective strategies, even though the industry may offer monetary incentives to do so. Specifically, the 4-H Clubs and Jaycees’ acceptance of tobacco money sends a mixed message, both about the perils of smoking and the tobacco companies’ true intent.

Consistently continue the anti-tobacco message. The tobacco industry has millions to spend in the promotion of their products. Local partnerships, then, must continue to consistently send their **antitobacco** messages. First, local, state, and national campaigns should consis-

tently reveal counteradvertising approaches used by tobacco companies. Second, state tobacco control efforts should assist local partnerships in training youth to analyze industry-sponsored ads. Third, local partnerships should lead by example, such as boycotting movies that promote smoking.

Role model the antitobacco message. Remember “think globally, act locally”? This should apply to the antitobacco effort as well. Boycott stores that sell tobacco products. Cancel magazine subscriptions that include tobacco product advertisements, and don’t buy magazines off the rack that sell tobacco ads. Discard for future use tobacco-product promotional products. **Note:** These activist methods can be done privately, in families or in community groups.

Stay current. Community partnerships should stay as current as possible with advertising/counterads by monitoring Web sites such as wholetruth.com, FTCC (www.ftcc.fsu.edu), Center for Disease Control’s Tobacco Information and Prevention Source Page (www.cdc.gov/tobacco), and Center for Substance Abuse (www.health.org). Additional Web sites include www.tobacco.org (tobacco news, resources for smokers trying to quit, government sites, reviews of movies regarding tobacco use), www.autonomy.com/smoke.htm (links to pro-health organizations and cessation information), www.infact.org (youth-oriented tobacco promotion information), and www.kickbutt.org (how to promote a healthy tobacco-free lifestyle for youth).

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Director, Debra Bodenshteyn
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Mae Waters, Ph.D., CHES*

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*Project Director/FTCC
University of Florida
Component Writer/
Subject Matter Expert
Dr. Steve Dorman,
Associate Professor
Department of Health Science
Education, University of Florida*

*Project Director, FTCC
Rebecca Augustyniak
Educational Services Program (ESP)
Florida State University*

*Writer/Editor
Andi Reynolds*

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Colin Dwyer*

*Editor
Peggy Armstrong*

*Production Supervisor
Carol Sanfilippo*

*Final Production Coordinator
Alice Fisher*

*Production Assistant
Edward Casey*

Contact

FTCC
210 Sliger Building
2035 E. Dirac Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2800
(850) 644-5549
Toll-free: (877) 682-FTCC (3822)
ftcc@mailers.fsu.edu

